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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

17 November 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT : Transmittal of Working Group C's  
Collection Program

1. Attached for your information and use are three copies of Working Group C's response to the request you levied at the 15 November WSAG meeting for a description of the collection program the U.S. intelligence community would undertake to satisfy the President's requirements as reaffirmed at that 15 November meeting within the ground rules there laid down. This paper has been reviewed by all members of Working Group C and coordinated without dissent.

2. The attached memorandum is a programmatic amplification of Working Group C's initial (10 November) study as reviewed at the 15 November WSAG meeting and there endorsed, save for the elimination of programmed post-settlement reconnaissance overflights over North Vietnam. The attached paper should hence be read and considered in conjunction with that 10 November study.

3. In particular, the attached memorandum takes as unchanged -- and hence does not repeat -- the 10 November study's language with respect to the 800-odd U.S. intelligence personnel, whose presence and activity in South Vietnam (as described in the 10 November study) are integral parts of the U.S. intelligence community's total collection program designed to service what we understand to be the President's requirements. Obviously the presence and activities of these U.S. intelligence personnel will have to be masked by the

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best cover arrangements devisable. Whatever be their cover, however, the implementation of our total collection program does require that some of these U.S. personnel perform liaison and advisory functions with military and civilian intelligence components of the GVN, e.g., in the field of signals intelligence. If liaison and advisory activity such as that outlined in the two companion Working Group C studies should be eliminated, we would not be able to provide the level and degree of Indochina intelligence coverage that we understand the President needs and wants provided.

/s/

Richard Helms  
Director

Attachment

Copies 1, 2 and 3

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